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A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT: THE DOCTRINAL RELATIONSHIP OF FM 100-5 (COORDINATING DRAFT) AND JOINT DOCTRINE

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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19971106 119

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SECOND TERM AY 96-97

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
Title of Monograph: *A Common Understanding of Conflict: The
Doctrinal Relationship of FM 100-5
(Coordinating Draft) and Joint Doctrine*

Approved by:




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ABSTRACT

A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT: THE DOCTRINAL
RELATIONSHIP OF FM 100-5 (COORDINATING DRAFT) AND JOINT DOCTRINE.
by MAJ Michael J. Flynn, USA, 43 pages.

A relatively new occurrence in the development of doctrine is that the services must now consider if their doctrine is consistent with that developed by the Joint Staff. Several important changes began with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to include vesting overall responsibility for the development of joint doctrine with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint doctrine is now both comprehensive and authoritative. This paper analyzes whether the comprehensive doctrine and model of conflict proposed in the draft version of the 1998 FM 100-5 is consistent with joint doctrine.

This study begins by examining the nature and purpose of military doctrine and provides a brief history of the role doctrine plays in the U.S. Army. Next, this monograph reviews the evolution of capstone joint doctrine since 1986 and the model of conflict currently accepted by the joint community. This discussion is followed by an introduction to FM 100-5 (Coordinating Draft) with a primary focus on the manual's model of conflict, categories of operations, and its comprehensive principles of operations. A comparative analysis is conducted of the models of conflict between FM 100-5 (Coordinating Draft) and joint doctrine to determine if the two models are fundamentally different in their explanation of war, conflict, and military operations.

This study concludes that while there are numerous similarities between the doctrine offered by FM 100-5 (Coordinating Draft) and joint doctrine, the two models of conflict and their associated principles are fundamentally different. This study also concludes that since joint doctrine is applicable to Army forces, FM 100-5 (Coordinating Draft) should be modified to better reflect the core concepts of joint doctrine. The study then proposes several recommendations for the modifications of proposed new FM 100-5.

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Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and unity of effort.

Joint Warfare Of The US Armed Forces, 1995

I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army is currently revising its capstone doctrinal manual—FM 100-5, *Operations*. Scheduled for publication in April 1998, the 14th edition of this manual is part of a series that began in 1905. The January 1997 release of FM 100-5 (Draft) marks the beginning of a coordination campaign and revision process to broaden the participation of the Army in the development of its new doctrine. Lasting about six months, this process will allow senior officials and the military public to identify issues and comment on the draft.¹

While there are numerous contextual differences (and similarities) between the current FM 100-5 and FM 100-5 (Draft), a significant change is the draft's holistic approach in describing the nature of modern conflict. One of the first steps in developing capstone doctrine is to develop or agree upon a model of conflict that describes the strategic environment in which military forces operate. Drawing from experience, present realities, and considerations for the near future, the model serves as a common starting point for the further development of principles and concepts that form the doctrine's core. This monograph evaluates FM 100-5 (Draft) 's proposed model of conflict and principles of operations to determine if they are compatible with Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*.

Joint Publication 3-0 describes the security environment as war, armed conflict, and peace. Military operations within these environments fall under three general categories: war, operations other than war involving the use or threat of force, and operations other than war not involving the use or threat of force.² After establishing the model of conflict known as the *range of military operations*, JP 3-0 recognizes the principles of war and the principles of OOTW that provide the foundation of joint doctrine. Approved in 1995, JP 3-0 provides a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint and multinational operations.

Guidance from the TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) Commander to the FM 100-5 writing team includes, “Fold... military activities short of general war into the body of Army operational doctrine and not treat them as separate....OOTW should not appear.”³ Considering this guidance, the authors of FM 100-5 (Draft) present a different model of conflict from JP 3-0 choosing not to separate conflict into general categories. Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) offers a holistic model of conflict suggesting that the nature of modern conflict blurs the traditional understandings of war and peace. Whether the nation is at war or at peace, a certain level of military, economic, political, and or informational competition exists. Within this realm of *conflict* (a state of competition or antagonism among nations and or non-state entities)⁴, the Army conducts operations to compel, deter, reassure and support. Army operations consist of one or more of the four categories of operations: offense, defense, stability, and support. Moreover, FM 100-5 (Draft) revises the current principles of war and OOTW by offering

a set of eleven comprehensive *principles of operations* that apply to all four categories of operations.⁵

Problem And Significance

A relatively new occurrence in doctrine development is that the services now must consider if their doctrine is consistent with that of the Joint Staff.⁶ Before the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act), service doctrine generally reflected their own parochial view of the conduct of war. Dr. Richard Swain in "Filling The Void: The Operational Art And The U.S. Army" writes:

Army doctrine was written secure in the belief that the central problem it was to solve was "winning the land battle [1976 FM 100-5]". This restricted view insured that little attention was paid to more catholic and multiservice concerns, or to the divergence of perspective on war fighting that divide the services, especially the ground and air forces....Moreover, the limited scope of the problem tended to support a rather comfortable view that ground combat was the central activity in any conflict and any other players were simply supporting cast.⁷

Several important changes in joint doctrine development began with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. To provide unified effort among the services and improve efficiency of the Department of Defense, Congress directed several changes. Part of the changes included vesting overall responsibility for the development of joint doctrine with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). To fulfill this mission, the Chairman reorganized the Joint Staff in early 1987 by establishing the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J7). A separate Joint Doctrine Division within the J7 assumed the duties of producing a comprehensive body of joint doctrine. The services, Joint Staff, and the combatant commands all contributed in developing the first iteration

of joint doctrine under this new system. By 1995, a second series of capstone and keystone doctrine was complete that is now both comprehensive and authoritative.⁸

Though the CJCS is vested with the authority and responsibility for the development of joint doctrine, individual departments are responsible for their service specific doctrine. Title 10, United States Code, directs the service departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces.⁹ Service doctrine is critical to ensuring the accomplishment of these directed responsibilities. Additionally, service doctrine must also remain relevant and adapt to the change. Changes such as force size, new weapon systems, and changes in the security environment, require that the services continuously evaluate and revise their doctrine as necessary. The Army has had free rein on changing its capstone doctrine in the past. Now, for the first time, Army capstone doctrine is being revised underneath a comprehensive and authoritative body of joint doctrine.

While each service is unique in its capabilities, services rarely conduct operations independently. Joint doctrine is key to providing a common framework for all the services. This point requires that the services carefully consider joint doctrine when revising their doctrine. The Army, with its long tradition and institutional knowledge of doctrine, has greatly contributed in the expansion and quality of joint doctrine. Unity of effort among the services and the joint community may be at risk, however, if Army doctrine is significantly different from joint doctrine. This monograph seeks to answer the following question: Is the model of conflict and principles of operations adopted in FM 100-5 (Draft) consistent with JP 3-0?

Methodology

This monograph examines the nature and purpose of military doctrine and provides a brief history of the role that doctrine plays in the U.S. Army. Next, this monograph reviews the evolution of capstone joint doctrine since 1986 and the model of conflict currently accepted by the joint community. This discussion is followed by an introduction to FM 100-5 (Draft) with a primary focus on the manual's model of conflict, categories of operations and its comprehensive principles of operations. The analysis portion of the monograph is divided into two sections. First, this chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the models of conflict and their associated principles outline in FM 100-5 (Draft) and JP 3-0. Second, the relationship between joint and Army doctrine is analyzed to determine the extent that Army doctrine incorporates joint concepts.

II. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military historian Michael Howard once stated, “I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong.”¹⁰ Howard further suggests that it does not really matter. “What matters is the capacity of militaries to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. The task of military science in the age of peace is to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.”¹¹ The recent doctrine of AirLand Battle and its modification in the 1993 version of FM 100-5 are examples of the U.S. Army getting it right before the “moment arrives.” Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and the numerous successful operations other than war the Army conducted in the 1990s are testimony to the soundness of our doctrine. Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) is another step in the revision process to ensure our doctrine remains relevant, achievable, acceptable, and adaptable in the evolving complex security environment. This chapter discusses the nature and purpose of doctrine and provides a brief history of the role that doctrine played in the U.S. Army.

Doctrine and Its Purpose

Military doctrine is the fundamental set of beliefs in the application of force that serves at the heart of a military’s competence. Considering sound theory and principles, doctrine provides military organization with a common language—a way of thinking as a corporate body about the business of war. Dr. James Schneider, a professor at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies writes, “Military doctrine... is the practical application of theoretical knowledge by real-world armies...”¹² Doctrine

provides the military with the common base of how to think, study, develop and apply the *means and ways* to achieve the *ends* in war.

A common doctrine is important both for military efficiency and organizational learning and helps develop a shared picture of the future we seek to create. A study of organizational learning suggests that one of the keys to great organizations is to build a common understanding of the future—or shared vision.¹³ This concept applied to the military suggests that a universal understanding of the nature of conflict is key in developing a shared vision. Doctrine is a useful tool to accomplish this goal serving as the sanctioned model of the application of military power. Taught in service schools, doctrine has an immense impact on the development of individual mental models. Mental models represent an individual's internalization of the environment based on deeply ingrained perceptions of situations that evolve from experience, assumptions, and generalizations. These models allow individuals to rapidly access situations often without consciously thinking about them.¹⁴ When the base paradigm of conflict and principles of war are different among component services, common mental models and shared vision within the U.S. military are unlikely.

Doctrine at the capstone level is an authoritative guide to actions based on principles and operational concepts. Doctrine at the tactical level becomes descriptive focusing on the “how to” including tactics, techniques and procedures. Regardless of the level and focus of doctrine, it ultimately derives from theory or a combination of theories of war. Operational concepts evolve by viewing realities (threat, history, national security policy, technology, economics and social influences) through the lens of military




Fig. 1.¹⁵

theory. From mature operational concepts, service, operational, and tactical doctrine are further developed.¹⁶

Several external and internal influences shape doctrinal development. Figure 1 shows some of the major external influences with other noteworthy influences including budgetary constraints and public support. Individual service and branch experiences, interservice relationships, service parochialism, and selected high level military officials have immense internal influences on military doctrine.¹⁷ Threat and national security policy are normally the primary influences on doctrine. The 1996 *National Security Strategy Of Engagement And Enlargement* for example, places some unique demands on U.S. military doctrine. "Our nation must maintain military forces sufficient to deter diverse threats and, when necessary, to fight and win against our adversaries."¹⁸ Serving a country that is a global power with interest abroad, the U.S. military must prepare itself to operate in locations around the world against multiple threats ranging from large

armies to small guerrilla bands. Whereas most militaries develop doctrine that considers one or two threats along their national borders, the U.S. military's doctrine must be applicable to multiple threats in diverse geography.¹⁹

The endless debate on the roles and missions of the services, along with the declining defense budget test interservice relationships and has a direct impact on doctrinal development. Doctrinal issues such as air and sea lift, the fire support coordination line, the control of long range missile fires, theater air defense, and close air support are just a few issues the services continue to debate. "Doctrine is a contentious issue because the services often cannot agree on the best way to prepare for the next war."²⁰ Actually, the services often cannot agree on the best way to conduct war once started. Modern warfare is full of examples of interservice rivalries on the best way to prosecute war to include the most recent large scale war—Operation Desert Storm.

Healthy competition between the services generates the best possible thought for our doctrine. When this competition becomes a fight over roles, missions and ultimately defense dollars, the results are counter-productive to the security needs of the nation. The current FM 100-5, for example, emphasizes how the Army conducts operations as part of the joint team. While also emphasizing unified effort among the services, the authors of FM 100-5 (Draft) assert, "It is the conduct of sustained land operations, augmented by air and naval forces, that forms the core of the nation's ability to dominate an adversary. Wars are won on the ground. Only the Army can dominate the land, its populace and other resources."²¹ These statements reflect the frustration with the current debate on the future roles and mission of the Army.

Doctrine And The U.S. Army

From planning operations to modernization, doctrine today touches virtually every aspect of the Army. The origins of U.S. Army doctrine trace to the Continental Army at Valley Forge. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, aid and inspector general to George Washington, introduced the first drill manual to the American Army in 1778. Von Steuben's *Regulation for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* emphasized simplicity and standardization in drill and musketry that prepared the Army to face British regulars that remained in force into the early 19th century. Though the Prussian's drill manual marked the beginning of U.S. Army doctrine, no official doctrinal literature system or headquarters existed until the early 20th century. During the American Civil War officers from both North and South depleted book stores for various private works on the Napoleonic Wars to serve as their guide for command.²²

Following the Civil War, Emory Upton (Civil War General and prominent military tactician and intellectual) wrote an important reform treatise, *The Military Policy of the United States*. Upton's work fathered the ideas of a modern general staff and a system of military schools that added not only to the professionalism of the Army but also provided the catalyst for the growth of doctrine. Upton's ideas were carried out in 1903 when the Army created the War Department Staff. By 1905, the War Department published the Army's first official manual of general doctrine entitled *Field Service Regulations* to which the current FM 100-5 traces its origins. The Army updated this regulation to incorporate the lessons of World War I into the late 1920s.²³

A high point in the evolution of army doctrine was the publication of the 1941 *Field Service Regulation*. With the strategic environment drastically changed and the nation on the verge of war, the Army needed to adapt quickly. Colonel Michael Rampy in “The Keystone Doctrine: FM 100-5, *Operations*” points out, “The challenges to the Army were clear, develop doctrine for the appropriate time or suffer the consequences. We focused our energies and got it right—although not without updating the manual at better than once a-year-rate throughout the war.”²⁴ Army doctrine changed considerably between World War II and the publication of the 1976 version of FM 100-5. Doctrine during this period was influenced by a variety of factors to include improved conventional and nuclear weapons, mobility, desires of different military leaders, branch clashes, interservice rivalry, and evolving national security policy.²⁵

By the end of the Korean War, Army doctrine remained essentially the same as the doctrine developed in World War II, but with an increased emphasis on firepower. Following the end of the Korean War, the Army’s doctrinal focus shifted to the nuclear battlefield. The idea that the Army could not afford separately organized forces for conventional and nuclear warfare led to the creation of the “pentomic divisions”. With the prodding by the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, the Army examined its limited war and counterinsurgency doctrine. Nevertheless, the Army was doctrinally unprepared as it entered the Vietnam War.²⁶

The U.S. Army emerged from one of the most traumatic periods in its history following the end of the Vietnam War. After analyzing the lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Army’s leadership determined that its doctrine and force

capability were inadequate to the requirements determined by world wide U.S. security interests. With the activation of TRADOC under General William E. DePuy, doctrine achieved a new importance in the American Army. Of the four primary functions assigned to this new organization (doctrine, organization, equipping, and training), DePuy saw doctrine as the organization's first priority serving as the engine of change for the remaining three. While the concepts developed in the 1976 FM 100-5 were short lived, the doctrinal development process and the public debates that followed the manual's publication began a doctrinal renaissance in the Army.²⁷

The army underwent a period of intellectual growth between 1974 and 1986. Largely spurred by the debates over what doctrine "should be" after publication of the 1976 FM 100-5, the Army's recognition of the operational level of war filled a void in U.S. military thought.²⁸ Beginning with the 1982 version of FM 100-5, Army doctrine began to recognize the relationship between tactical battles and engagements with strategic ends. Influenced by the instruction offered at the newly created School of Advanced Military Studies, the authors of the 1986 version FM 100-5 expanded the discussion of operational art. Known as AirLand Battle, operational art in Army doctrine was firmly established by 1986. This doctrine provided a central element of the NATO deterrent and helped provide the war-winning operational maneuver of the Gulf War.²⁹

The end of the Cold War and the 1991 decisive victory over Iraqi forces in the Gulf War brought about a new strategic era. Like General DePuy, Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan saw doctrine as the engine of change that would lead the Army into the 21st century. General Sullivan saw the Gulf War as the first major conflict of the

post-industrial era and concluded that warfare was at a point in which raw industrial might and manpower intensive armies were neither necessary nor supportable. General Sullivan charged the new TRADOC Commander, General Fredrick M. Franks, to revise the Army's capstone doctrine by retaining the winning principles and fundamentals of AirLand Battle but also accommodating the changes in the new security environment. This doctrine would provide the foundation and drive for the Army's organizational design, training focus, leader development, and acquisition process into the 21st Century. Considering the changes in the world's security environment, the 1993 version of FM 100-5 included the strategy of force projection and the introduction of OOTW.³⁰

Doctrine As The Engine Of Change

Historians Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in *Military Misfortunes* remind us that military failure stems from the inability to learn, anticipate, and adapt to change.³¹ In the last six years, the size of the U.S. Army has decreased from nearly a million man force to a force under five hundred thousand soldiers. While downsizing, the Army participated in one major regional conflict in Southwest Asia and conducted six significant operations other than war in Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, the Sinai, and northern and southern Iraq.³² In addition, the Army aided in countless operations from Los Angeles to Rwanda, all occurring while the army was adapting to the changing world's security environment. Changes in the national security policy, threat, and military technologies require the U.S. military to adapt and embrace change or eventually be overcome by events. The doctrinal development process is a tool for managing change.

A brief discussion of complexity theory is useful in understanding the importance of using doctrine as a tool for managing change in large complex systems. According to M. W. Waldrop in *Complexity*, a complex system is a system with many independent agents that interact with each other allowing the system as a whole to continue to learn and grow. Complexity theory suggests that complex adaptive systems evolve best at *the edge of chaos*. This does not mean these systems are chaotic and out of control, but that these systems have somehow acquired the ability to bring order and chaos into a special kind of balance. The balance point, referred to as the edge of chaos, is where components of a system never stabilize, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence. Complex adaptive systems at the edge of chaos are where new ideas and innovation challenge the status quo that eventually overthrows the old guard. In essence, complex adaptive systems learn from their environment.³³

The U.S. armed forces, a complex adaptive system, is a learning organization that continuously evolves. The services, combatant and specified commands, and the Joint Staff are all independent agents within a larger system referred to as the Department of Defense. The rapid changes in the world's security environment and technology require the U.S. military to anticipate the future yet remain capable of conducting operations in the present. The doctrinal development process plays a major role in ensuring the U.S. armed forces continue to learn, grow, and adapt.

Within the U.S. military's doctrinal development process, operational doctrine maintains the balance point in complexity. Ideally, the U.S. military operates at the "edges of chaos". Armies that remain on the stability line and do not adapt to changes




Fig. 2.³⁴

are at a significant disadvantage to those armies that continuously look to the future developing new doctrine, tactics, and weapon systems.³⁵ On the other hand, armies that move beyond the edge of chaos, and attempt to change too quickly will break apart in the turbulence. The doctrinal development process provides the mechanisms for the military to find the balance point on the edge of chaos.

As depicted in figure 2, operational concepts such as the *Army After Next* looks well into the future and lie beyond the edge of chaos representing a best guess of the nature of future warfare. Joint Vision 2010 and TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, fall closer to the edge of chaos but have not yet matured for application in the field. Looking into the future five to fifteen years, these ideas help the military anticipate and adapt to change.³⁶

As operational concepts mature, doctrine is developed falling between the lines

of stability and the edge of chaos. Operational doctrine must look to the near future to set direction for modernization and be flexible enough to manage the uncertainties that will arise in conflict. Capstone doctrine, however, cannot look too far in the future because it must address the realities of the present time. Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) reflects the deliberate thought process in managing the intellectual and physical change for the army. For example, the future concept of information dominance developed in TRADOC Pam 525-5 (1993) was too advanced for inclusion in the 1993 version of FM 100-5. This ideas, however, now appears in the draft FM 100-5. Tactical doctrine, on the other hand, is placed closer to the line of stability in that the focus of this doctrine is on “how to fight,” bringing order and discipline to the complexity of war.

Two important points emerge from this chapter regarding the relationship between FM 100-5 (Draft) and joint doctrine. First, the Army uses doctrine as a tool to manage change. Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) is no exception to this long established pattern. Second, doctrine provides a common picture of the future and basic understanding of the conduct of military operations. Since both the Army and the Joint Staff use doctrine to manage change and develop shared vision, a point of friction will most likely occur if the two respective doctrines are fundamentally different. This brings us to the central issue. How does the Army revise its capstone doctrine to ensure it remains relevant in the changing security environment, yet remaining consistent with joint capstone doctrine that is not on the same revision cycle? The next two chapters look at the models of conflict and principles currently accepted by the joint community and the proposed model and principles of operations offered in FM 100-5 (Draft).

III. JOINT DOCTRINE AND THE MODEL OF CONFLICT

Since World War II, Congress has repeatedly intervened to correct the recurring problems of poor cooperation between the services. The National Security Act of 1947 significantly overhauled the U.S. defense establishment marking the first of twenty major congressional initiatives to strengthen the unity of the armed forces and their ability to conduct joint operations.³⁷ In the past decade, “jointness” has become a top concern both in Congress and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The combination of the aborted Iranian hostage mission, poor interoperability among the services during the invasion of Grenada, and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in the early 1980s, spurred a congressional call for reform. The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was another major step taken by Congress to correct the recurring problems of fractured command authority and poor cooperators between the services. This chapter examines the evolution of joint doctrine since 1986 and the model of conflict and principles of war and OOTW currently accepted by the joint community.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Evolution of Joint Doctrine

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 laid out specific changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, and the military departments to correct many real and perceived problems.³⁸ Among other key changes, the Goldwater-Nichols Act vested the responsibility and authority to produce joint doctrine with the CJCS. To fulfill this mission, the Chairman reorganized the Joint Staff in early 1987 by establishing the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate

(J7). Areas of responsibilities for the J7 included joint plans, training, exercise, evaluation, doctrine, education, and interoperability. The J7 established a separate Joint Doctrine Division specifically focused on joint doctrine development.³⁹ A doctrinal review conducted by the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, and the services, led to the CJCS approving a Doctrine Master Plan in February 1988. The Doctrine Master Plan laid out the required joint publications and the agencies responsible for their development. The publication of JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* in November 1991, marked the beginning of a new era in the evolution of joint doctrine.⁴⁰

In 1992, JP 1-01, *Joint Publication System*, formalized the process of assigning a “lead agent” to each proposed joint publication. Individual services, the Joint Staff, and combatant or specified command serve as lead agents. The tasks of the lead agents include developing the first draft of a joint publication, manage the coordination and review process, and maintain the manual after publication. The Army for example, is currently the lead agent for twenty-six of about one hundred joint doctrinal publications to include JP 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*.⁴¹ By 1993 the first iteration of joint capstone and keystone manuals were complete. After testing and evaluating these manuals in the field, the joint staff in 1995 published a second iteration of joint capstone and keystone publications.

One of the significant changes between the first iterations of joint capstone publications (1991-1993) and the second (1995), was the authoritative nature of the second iterations. The cause for this shift was twofold. First, the CJCS was uncomfortable with the level in which the U.S. armed forces understood joint doctrine.




Fig. 3.⁴²

After evaluating several joint training exercises along with the tragic April 1994 downing of two Army Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq by two Air Force F-15 fighters, the CJCS directed a review of the role and purpose of joint doctrine. Second, the Chairman “...inferred that the services may not feel obligated to adhere to joint doctrine.”⁴³ This resulted in the change of the qualifier that appeared in all joint doctrine publications from “This publication is authoritative but not directive...” to

The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces....⁴⁴

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint doctrine evolved into a series of authoritative and comprehensive publications addressing the full range of military operations. The 1995 edition of JP 1 reads, “Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures;

feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises, and operations; *and ensure Service doctrine and procedures are consistent* [my emphasis].”⁴⁵ Similarly to how the Army defines the role of doctrine for itself, the CJCS affirms that joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war. He further states that joint doctrine as authoritative—providing the distilled insights and wisdom gained from the collective experiences with warfare.⁴⁶

The Range of Military Operations

The current model of conflict accepted by the joint community derived from the 1993 version of FM 100-5. Introduced in 1995, JP 3-0 lists the states of the security environment as war, armed conflict, and peace. Military operations within these environments fall under three general categories respectively: war, operations other than war involving the use of threat of force; and operations other than war not involving the use or threat of force. The range of military operations stretches from large-scale combat operations to peacetime operations involving nation assistance. The joint model of conflict associates varying degrees of combat with military operations from large-scale, sustained combat in war to no combat in peacetime disaster relief operations. Joint doctrine states the national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations, placing the United States in a wartime state. When this occurs, the goal of the U.S. armed forces are to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible to achieve the national objectives on terms favorable to the United States. Operations

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS		
Military Operations	General US Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Large-scale Combat Operations Attack / Defend / Blockades
	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement / NEO Strikes / Raids / Show of Force Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping
	Promote Peace	Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Civil Support / Counter Drug NEO
NONCOMBAT		
Operations Other Than War		

Fig. 4.⁴⁷

other than war focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, and promoting peace. “While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations—other than war.”⁴⁸ The joint model of conflict allows the U.S. military to remain focused on conventional interstate war while recognizing that a new security environment dictates special considerations for a host of operations short of general war.⁴⁹

The concept of dividing “war” or “conflict” into component parts is not new. Nor is the idea new that limited war or operations other than war require different considerations in tactics and the application of military force from those in general war. The 1940 edition of the United States Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* for example, captured eighty-five years of collective experience of the Marine Corps in limited war.⁵⁰ A basic theme in Army doctrine in the 1950s recognized the need to operate anywhere along the spectrum of conflict from show of force to general nuclear war. The

withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the renewal of a conventional focus on the European battlefield, however, saw the disappearance of operations short of conventional war from Army capstone doctrine up to the 1986 version of FM 100-5. According to a 1992 RAND study on doctrine, the lack of Army capstone doctrine addressing low intensity conflict (LIC) "... convinced a generation of soldiers that armies exist to fight conventional war, implying that anything short of that type of conflict was someone else's responsibility."⁵¹

The mid-1980s saw several joint and multi-service initiatives concerning the development of LIC doctrine. The Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict was the source for LIC doctrine in joint publications with TRADOC serving as the primary review authority.⁵² The breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact brought about a new strategic environment in which LIC assumed new importance. With the fifty years of preparations for conventional conflict in Europe over, the national leadership looked forward to a peace dividend. Questions concerning the continued relevance of maintaining a large U.S. military force structure led to rapid demobilization following Operation Desert Storm. Hopes of a peaceful "new world order," however, were quickly shattered as much of the developing world renewed old ethnic conflicts and tribal hatreds. "Nation states" slipped into various shapes of anarchy. With a national security strategy calling for an increased commitment by the United States to promote stability and security in and among developing nations, coupled with a declining force structure, all services were required to reevaluate their roles, missions, and doctrine. Whereas the Soviet naval, air, and tank fleets were the primary threat to the U.S. armed forces in the

1980s, international crime, hunger, and ethnic violence became an increased concern for the military in the 1990s. Considering a change in the threat and a new national security strategy, the Army introduced a new model of conflict in its 1993 publications of FM 100-5. The Army not only brought OOTW to a new level of importance in its internal capstone doctrine, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the Army's model of conflict into joint doctrine in 1995.

The joint model of conflict sets the basis for further explanation of the fundamental concept of joint operations. The nine principles of war and six principles of OOTW are two sets of fundamentals that guide joint operations. While the principles of war generally apply to war in its traditional sense, these principles also apply to operations other than war involving combat. The nine principles of war currently recognized by all the services and the joint community include: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity. Both JP 3-0 and JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War*, points out that political considerations permeate all levels of war during OOTW and that the military may not be the primary player.⁵³ As a result, these operations normally require more restrictive rules of engagement than war. Joint and current Army doctrine recognize that the OOTW environment is unique and offer six applicable principles for consideration. The principles of OOTW are: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy (see appendix 1: Principles of War and OOTW).

Whereas the first three principles of OOTW are similar to the principles of war, the last three are OOTW specific. The principle of *restraint* calls for the prudent

application of military capability. Commanders must carefully balance the need for security, the use of force, and the political objective. *Perseverance* requires the commander to consider the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. The principle of *legitimacy* emphasizes that committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. “Legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions.”⁵⁴ Perseverance applied to peacekeeping operations for example, requires commanders to maintain a long term focus on strategic objectives when making tactical decisions. Additionally, when considering the principle of restraint and legitimacy, peacekeeping demands that the peacekeeping force maintain strict neutrality in a potentially hostile environment.⁵⁵

The model of conflict in joint doctrine recognizes the differences and interrelationships between war, conflict and peace. While keeping a focus on war in its traditional sense, joint doctrine also emphasizes the nature of modern conflict includes a host of military operations short of general war. The principles of OOTW are an extension of warfighting doctrine that help ensure success by focusing on the aspects of OOTW that require careful considerations. Both the Army and joint community currently accept this model of conflict that separates military operations into two categories—war and operations other than war.

IV: THE COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE OF FM 100-5 (DRAFT)

The January 1997 release of Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) represents a year of collective effort by the Combined Arms Center's FM 100-5 writing team in the development of the Army's new operational doctrine. Scheduled for publication in April 1998, this second iteration of post-Cold War operational doctrine will guide the Army into the 21st Century. The release of the draft marked the beginning of a coordination campaign to allow several joint and Army organizations to comment on the proposed doctrine. Participants in the coordination campaign include key army leaders, the joint staff, combatant and specified commands, major subordinate commands, army schools, and the army public.⁵⁶ The model of conflict adopted in FM 100-5 (Draft) serves as the foundation for the manual's structure and operational concepts. While the coordination campaigns will undoubtedly lead to some modifications to the draft before final publication, changes to the manual's model of conflict will require a major rewrite to the manual. This chapter examines the Army's proposed operational doctrine with emphasis on the manual's model of conflict and principles of operations.

The Nature of Modern Conflict

Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) reflects a continuation of Army thinking in the new, strategic era following the Cold War. The doctrine considers the national and military security strategies of the United States to include the strategy of force projection and the importance of the Army to integrate into joint and combined operations. The charter to the FM 100-5 writing team is to produce a comprehensive doctrine that accounts for and




Fig. 5.

exploits change in the strategic situation, advances in technology, and domestic realities. Figure 5 above lists the specific guidance to the writing team.⁵⁷

There are several differences between the draft and the current FM 100-5. Of the major changes offered, the holistic model of conflict is the most significant. Whereas the current FM 100-5 and joint doctrine break conflict into component parts (War and OOTW), the TRADOC Commander directs the authors of the draft that military operations short of general war be folded into a single comprehensive body of operational doctrine. Chapter 2, The Nature of Modern Conflict, proposes a new model of conflict that provides the foundation for the manual. Stating that conflict is a state of competition or antagonism between nations and non-state entities, the military conducts operations within this environment to *deter*, *compel*, *reassure* and *support*. Whether international war or natural disasters, this chapter suggests that the nature of conflict in the 1990s blurs the traditional 19th and 20th century understanding of war and peace. "In

the environment in which today's international disputes take place, state fragmentation; struggles for resources; nationalism; tribal, and ethnic motivations; expanding populations and urbanization; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are ever more the norm."⁵⁸ The Army serves as the primary land component for the U.S. Armed forces in conflict resolution.

According to the draft, Army forces conduct four basic categories of operations to accomplish assigned missions within joint and or combined operations. The four categories include:

Offensive operations are those that carry the fight to the enemy. They are the decisive form of warfare, the commander's ultimate means of imposing his will on the enemy. *Defensive operations* are those undertaken to cause an enemy attack to fail. Alone, they achieve no decision. They must ultimately be combined with or followed by offensive actions. *Stability operations* apply military power to influence the political environment, facilitate diplomacy, and disrupt specified illegal activities. They include both development and coercive actions. *Support operations* provide essential supplies and services to assist designated groups. They are conducted mainly to relieve suffering and assist civil authorities responding to crises. Support operations are normally characterized by lack of an active opponent.⁵⁹

The utility of the draft's model of conflict requires commanders to carefully consider all categories of operations when involved in conflict resolution. While a predominant category of operations may exist at a given echelon or during a particular time or place in the area of operations, all four types of operations may be executed simultaneously. For example, during the initial stages of a conflict, stability operations may prevail with defense and support operations ongoing in the area of operations. Upon defeating the opposing force with offensive operations, the character of the operations may switch back to stability or support operations. Figure 6 on the following page depicts this concept.




Fig. 6.⁶⁰

The Nature of Modern Conflict Applied

After establishing the nature of modern conflict, the draft discusses the fundamentals that guide and instruct army operations. These fundamentals include the Army's operational concept, the principles of operations, core functions, categories of operations, operating systems, and concept of complementary and reinforcing effects.⁶¹ It is difficult, however, to identify a common set of principles that reasonably apply across the full spectrum of conflict. To support the holistic model of conflict, however, it is necessary to have a set of principles that have universal application. Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) lists eleven principles of operations that instruct and inform the conduct of operations at all levels. The draft instructs that there are no priority among the principles and should be viewed as a whole. Regarding the principles of war, FM 100-5 (Draft) reads, "The experience over the past 75 years has taught that the list was not complete and two principles, morale and exploitation have been added."⁶² Whereas the authors

state that the principles of operations are a combination of the principles of war and the principles of OOTW, a closer examination reveals that the principles of OOTW (restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) were deleted.




Fig. 7.⁶³

Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) recognizes that the principles are not a checklist. The principles of operations do not apply equally to every situation or operation, or do not always apply in the same way to every situation. In comparing the draft's principles of operations to the principles of war and OOTW listed in current army and joint doctrine, we can note both similarities and differences. The principles of operations slightly change two principles of war. The principle of mass now is *massed effects* and the principle of unity of command is the principle of *unity of effort* combined from the

principles of OOTW. The additions of morale and exploitation are new and are not included in joint doctrine. The Army's principles of operations drop the OOTW principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. While these three principles of OOTW are deleted, FM 100-5 (Draft) incorporates their intent into the imperatives listed for stability and support operations. An abstract of the principles of operations and imperatives of Army operations from FM 100-5 (Draft) is at appendix 2.

The changes offered in the draft FM 100-5 require more than a casual reading by those schooled in current army or joint doctrine to comprehend many of the new concepts introduced in the manual. In addition to the principle of operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) modifies the tenets of army operations (now called *characteristics*) by subordinating the tenet of synchronization as a subset of the new characteristic *orchestrations*. Additionally, the manual adds to the fundamentals of army operations the concept of *core functions*. Core functions (see, shape, strike, shield, and move), are the fundamental actions forces take to apply military power.⁶⁴ The draft replaces the term battlefield operating systems with the term *operating systems* consisting of two basic categories: *engagement systems* and *integrating systems*.⁶⁵ The manual also addresses in detail the *art of operations* to include leadership, command, planning and execution of army operations with an emphasis on joint and combined operations. Figure 8 on the following page depicts the relationship between the fundamentals of army operations.




Fig. 8.⁶⁶

While there are significant differences between FM 100-5 (Draft) and the current manual, much remains the same. Interestingly, after introducing a series of new concepts, the “how to” portion of the draft closely follows the current FM. The battlefield framework is still close, deep, reconnaissance and security, reserve, and rear operations. Though the forms of the tactical offense are now called types of offensive operations, they still follow the general forms of movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Of the thirteen different types of activities listed as operations other than war in the current FM 100-5, all but one (attacks and raids) are listed as a types of operations under stability or support operations in FM 100-5 (Draft).

V: ANALYSIS

This monograph has examined the nature and purpose of military doctrine and provided a history of the role doctrine played in the Army and the joint community since 1986. This discussion showed that while the army has traditionally led the doctrinal development process, joint doctrine is now both comprehensive and authoritative. The examination of complexity theory showed that the doctrinal development process is key in the adaptation and evolution of the U.S. armed forces serving as a tool to manage change. The discussion on systems thinking addressed how mental models affect individual's perceptions of the environment and that doctrine can foster shared vision assisting in organizational learning and efficiency. The analysis in this chapter is in two sections. First, this chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the models of conflict and principles between FM 100-5 (Draft) and JP 3-0. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the models of conflict are fundamentally different in their explanations of the environment in which military forces operate. Second, this chapter analyzes the relationship between joint and service doctrine to determine the extent that Army doctrine incorporates joint concepts. This analysis provides the basis for answering the question: Is the model of conflict and principles of operations adopted in FM 100-5 (Draft) consistent with joint doctrine?

A Comparative Analysis Of The Models of Conflict

Both FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 serve as the capstone manual for their respective organizations and doctrinal publication systems. The models of conflicts in FM 100-5

(Draft) and JP 3-0 provide the starting point in each manual for the further explanation of principles and concepts that form the core of Army and joint doctrine respectively. The models of conflict in FM 100-5 (Draft) and JP 3-0, however, offer different ways to think about the most complex of human endeavors—war. The thought process to develop these models comes from two fundamentally different schools of thought. In the case of FM 100-5 (Draft), the model of conflict appears to derive from the belief that complex systems, like war, must be looked at from a holistic point of view. This thought process is known as systems thinking. Peter Senge in *The Fifth Discipline* writes,

From a very early age, we are taught to break apart problems, to fragment the world. This apparently makes complex tasks and subjects more manageable, but we pay a hidden, enormous price. We can no longer see the consequences of our actions; we lose our intrinsic sense of connection to a larger whole. When we then try to ‘see the big picture’ we try to reassemble the fragments in our minds, to list and organize all the pieces...the task is futile....Thus, after a while we give up trying to see the whole altogether.⁶⁷

The draft’s model of conflict derives from the school of thought, similar to systems thinking and complexity theory, that suggest war is too complex and must be examined in its simplest form—from its whole. The authors of FM 100-5 (Draft) quote Clausewitz in their briefing slides to support the draft’s holistic model of conflict. “In war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must be thought of together.”⁶⁸

Clausewitz, however, uses this statement to introduce his abstract (Absolute) model of war. Acknowledging that this model is theory and not “real war,” Clausewitz spends the next five hundred pages breaking real war into its component parts such as limited war, mountain warfare, offense and defense operations.




Fig. 9.

Regardless of one's interpretation of Clausewitz, the model of conflict in FM 100-5 (Draft) derives from the school of thought that suggests the best way to think about conflict is from its whole. Field Manual 100-5 (Daft)'s model of conflict suggests that the nature of modern conflict blurs the distinctions between war and peace with various levels of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic competition ongoing between nations and non-state entities. The Army conducts operations to compel, deter, reassure, and support within this environment. This holistic approach in explaining the nature of modern conflict requires a set of universal principles of operations to guide the planning and conduct of military operations within this model.

Joint Publication 3-0's model of conflict derives from a different thought process. The joint model takes the approach that since war is the most complex of human endeavors, it must be broken into separate, but related component parts (War and OOTW). While several scholars of learning organizations might disagree with this

approach, doctrine must have practical application.⁶⁹ While maintaining a view of the whole is useful in the study and development of military theory, the purpose of operational doctrine requires that abstract thoughts be translated into somewhat prescriptive applicable concepts in the use of military force. Breaking apart the complexities of war is useful both in explaining and managing complex problems. A reciprocal to Senge's warning is: By ignoring or oversimplifying the differences of the world's subsystems, one is left with little more than abstract thoughts that have little practical application in the real world. In describing the differences between his theoretical model of war and real war, Clausewitz writes, "If we were to think purely in absolute terms, we could avoid every difficulty by a stroke of the pen...."⁷⁰

From the parts of the whole, joint doctrine further develops war and OOTW by assigning a set of principles and fundamentals that guide the conduct of military operations within each category. Whereas past military doctrines focused on war in its traditional sense, joint doctrine recognizes a distinct difference and brings to the forefront those military operations that do not fall into the category of large-scale combat operations. Figure 10 on the following page graphically depicts the joint model of conflict. Note, that while joint doctrine separates conflict into three categories, the overlap of each categories depicted in figure 10 shows their interrelationship. Additionally, while JP 3-0 categorizes the states of environment, it also recognizes the simultaneous nature of theater operations. Operations other than war may or may not involve the use of force within a theater that could be in a wartime state. This concept is the essence of FM 100-5 (Draft)'s explanation of army operations.⁷¹




Fig. 10.⁷²

A quick read of FM 100-5 (Draft) might lead one to the conclusion that the draft simply replaces the term war with *conflict* and *operations*, and the term OOTW with the terms *stability* and *support operations*. The draft does refer to the levels of war as the *levels of conflict* and edits the writings of J.F.C. Fuller and Clausewitz by replacing the word war with *operations*.⁷³ Additionally, the draft's discussion on stability and support operations is very similar to JP 3-0's description of operations other than war. If this was merely the case, changing terms, than one must ask why change? Is it simply because the word OOTW is unpopular with high level officials within the Army? The discussion regarding the models of conflict and the thought process used to develop these models shows that the differences between FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 are more than semantic. The models are fundamentally different in their explanation of the environment in which military forces operate. The principles that guide the conduct of military operations within these models are the most significant.

While the draft addresses in detail the four categories of operations, the principles that guide these operations are focused at the more traditional military view of conflict—war. In the preface of the draft the authors state, “FM 100-5 Operations is first and foremost a warfighting manual.” While the Army’s primary mission is to fight and win, this *warfighting* focus of the manual’s principles fall short in addressing the other half of the Army’s mission—to deter war and support the policies of the nation. Of the twenty-five plus operations in which the Army participated in since 1991, only Operation Desert Storm falls under the “fight and win the nation’s wars” category. Surely the Army needs a capstone doctrine with associated principles that addresses the most violent, dangerous, and costly form of conflict which is war. The draft states. “The most violent form of conflict is war. In this most dangerous of enterprises, Army commanders seek to impose their will on adversaries at least cost to their own forces. To fail is to sacrifice the lives of their men and, potentially, the vital interest of the state.”⁷⁴ However, if the nature of conflict in the late 1980s to mid 1990s continues into the near future, the Army will find itself conducting operations where operations other than war require as much attention as warfighting in doctrinal principles.

The principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy in joint doctrine, emphasize that some environments require a mind shift from the traditional understanding of the application of military force. Offensive, massed effects, and surprise are all worthy principles when massing the elements of combat power in battle. In peacekeeping and or humanitarian assistance operations, however, the very nature and general goals of these operations call for the restraint of military force.

The Relationship Between Service and Joint Doctrine

The services base their doctrine on experiences and expertise in their respective mediums while joint doctrine guides the integration and use of these forces in joint operations.⁷⁵ The focus of Field Manual 100-5 is at the operational level that addresses how Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint team. In a sense, FM 100-5 is inherently “joint”. The Army will rarely conduct operations independently, if at all. Whether an Army corps serves as a joint task force headquarters or an Army corps’ provides the bulk of the ground combat power within a joint theater of operations, modern warfare is joint warfare. The services provide trained and equipped forces to joint force commanders that use joint doctrine as their guide in the planning and conduct of military operations. Joint Publication 3-0 states that the doctrine and guidance established in its publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. “The principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service.”⁷⁶

With the U.S. Army being a sub-component of the U.S. armed forces, a question arises is to what extent should FM 100-5 conform to JP 3-0. Is there a hierarchical relationship between the two manuals? No official line diagram depicts such a relationship. As previously stated, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was uncomfortable with the level in which the U.S. armed forces understood joint doctrine. Additionally, in 1994 he questioned whether the services felt obligated to adhere to joint doctrine. This resulted in the CJSC directing that all joint publications

contain a qualifier that states that the publication is authoritative; will be followed except in exception circumstances; and where differences between joint and service doctrine arise, joint doctrine will take precedence for the activities of joint forces. This statement does not prohibit the services from developing service specific doctrine. It does, however, suggest that the services need to closely examine joint doctrine to ensure their doctrine is consistent in areas such as the principles that guide the conduct of military operations.

In his guidance to the authors of FM 100-5 (Draft), the Combined Arms Center Commander directs, “ ‘Remain consistent with Joint Pub 3.0,’ but remember services’ responsibility to lead as well as reflect joint doctrine.”⁷⁷ Complexity theory teaches us that the competition and interaction among independent agents within larger systems is necessary for the organization to continually evolve and adapt. If joint doctrine is no longer applicable (while many would suggest otherwise), then it is the responsibility of the Army to work with the other services and joint staff to improve it. What is questionable, however, is the publication of a capstone service doctrine with many of its core concepts fundamentally different from joint doctrine, with the intent and or hope that joint doctrine will follow. Imagine the armor or infantry school changing the principles of war in one of their assigned brigade or battalion field manuals. Affecting change in joint doctrine by this process may have been the best way to jump start the joint doctrinal development process ten or even four years ago. However, joint doctrine, its development process, and its doctrinal organizations have progressed a long way since the passage of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Both the Army and the Joint Staff have similar views on the role and purpose of doctrine. The U.S. Army views its capstone doctrine as the statement of how it intends to conduct war and operations other than war as part of the joint team. Providing the intellectual focus that touches all aspects of the Army, the doctrine established in FM 100-5 facilitates communications, promotes a shared vision, and “serves as the basis for curriculum in the Army school system.”⁷⁸ The Joint Staff defines doctrine as:

...the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experiences with warfare....Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.⁷⁹

The Army and Joint Staff see doctrine as a means of developing common mental models within their organization to improve the planning for and execution of military operations. Service doctrine and joint doctrine both serve as the basis for curriculum in the U.S. military schools systems. There could very well be a generation of Army officers taught two separate doctrines of war—one for Army operations and one for joint operations. The problem is that Army forces rarely operate independently suggesting that Army doctrine should at least mirror joint doctrine in its understanding of the nature of conflict and its principles of operations.

VI: CONCLUSION

The proposed second iterations of post-Cold War Army capstone doctrine offers a different way of viewing the security environment. In the formulation of its model of conflict and guiding principles of operations, FM 100-5 (Draft) considers lessons from the past, present day realities, and looks to the future. The draft draws upon the best of military theorist, joint doctrine, and introduces original concepts. The authors of FM 100-5 (Draft), however, chose not to distinguish between the categories of conflict, and fold operations other than war and war into a comprehensive body of Army operational doctrine. This approach creates a dichotomy with JP 3-0.

While this monograph reflects a bias favoring the explanation of the security environment and principles of war and OOTW listed in the current FM 100-5 and JP 3-0, this was not the purpose of the monograph. The purpose of this monograph is not to determine whether FM 100-5 (Draft) or JP 3-0 offer a better explanation of the nature of modern conflict or which set of principles is more applicable in today's complex security environment. By focusing at the core of each organization's capstone manual, the purpose of this paper is to determine whether the comprehensive doctrine adopted in FM 100-5 (Draft) and its model of conflict are consistent with joint doctrine.

Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the holistic approach taken by FM 100-5 (Draft) that does not categorize types of conflict is fundamentally different from joint doctrine. Joint doctrine makes a conscious effort to delineate between large-scale combat operations (war) and operations other than war that may or may not involve

combat. Second, while many of the principles of operations in FM 100-5 (Draft) incorporate the principles of war and OOTW, the list and its narrative does not incorporate the principles of restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance recognized by joint doctrine. In addition, the principles of operations morale and exploitation do not appear in joint principles. Since both JP 3-0 and FM 100-5 (Draft) recognize that their principles are the bedrock of military doctrine, these differences present a conflict between the two doctrines. The third conclusion is that the draft should be modified to reflect joint doctrine. While FM 100-5 is an Army manual, the Army rarely conducts operations independently. Additionally, the focus of FM 100-5 is at the operational level of war, making it inherently joint in nature.

Since FM 100-5 (Draft) is built around the framework of its holistic model of conflict and principles of operations, modification to either of these concepts would cause a major rewrite of the manual. Unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff makes an issue of the differences between JP 3-0 and FM 100-5 (Draft), significant modification to the manual's bedrock is unlikely. Two recommendations may help to better connect the Army's new doctrine with JP 3-0. First, a brief discussion (possibly in the preface or in the part one of the FM 100-5), acknowledging the joint perspective that separates the environment of conflict into war and OOTW. From here, FM 100-5 may then lead into what JP 3-0 describes as the simultaneous nature of theater operations. This sets the stage to introduce the concept that within this simultaneous environment of joint and combined operations, army operations consist of a combination of offense, defense, stability, and or support operations. Second, FM 100-5 should capture the intent

of legitimacy in the discussion of stability imperatives, and the intent of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy in the discussion of support imperatives.

At the operational level, doctrine is neither pure theory nor dogmatic. Doctrine lies along the continuum between theory and application. Both Army and joint capstone doctrine emphasize that doctrine is not an end to itself. Doctrine at the operational level provides broad concepts and principles requiring leader's judgment in application. "The desired outcome is to establish a pattern of thought—a common cultural bias—resulting in optimal performance across a broad range of possibilities."⁸⁰

The U.S. military must continue to learn, adapt, and evolve as it enters into the twenty-first century. If it remains set in its tactics, doctrine, and organization, the U.S. armed forces will surely meet the same fate as other militaries failing to evolve. The Army's latest revision of its capstone doctrine presents some interesting challenges in developing a shared vision both internal and external to the Army. While the Army must continue to revise its doctrine, the Army must also consider the possible negative effects that a revised doctrine not consistent with joint doctrine will have on its own members and the joint community. The importance of the U.S. armed forces as a whole to share a common model of conflict and principles that guide military operations is imperative for success.

APPENDIX 1: PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OOTW

Below are the principles of war and principles of OOTW extracted from JP 3-0.⁸¹

1. Principles of War. The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.

a. **Objective:** The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and the will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operations. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

b. **Offensive:** The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or re seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

c. **Mass:** The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint forces capabilities where they will have decisive effect in short periods of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating force, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

d. **Economy of Force:** The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

e. **Maneuver:** The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force....

f. **Unity of Command:** The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means

that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command.

g. **Security:** The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Applications of this principle include prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

h. **Surprise:** The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variation in tactics and methods of operations.

i. **Simplicity:** The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plan allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat are especially critical to success in combined operations.

2. Principles of OOTW. The principles of war, though principally associated with large-scale combat operations, generally apply to military operations other than war, though sometimes in different ways. However, the political considerations and the nature of many military operations other than war require an underpinning of additional principles listed below.

a. **Objective:** Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. This principle of war applies also to operations other than war. A clearly defined and attainable objective—with a precise understanding of what constitute success—is critical when the United States is involved in operations other than war. Military commanders should also understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination, as well as those that yield failure. JFCs must also understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.

b. **Unity of Effort:** The principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other than war; but, in operations other than war, this principle may be more difficult to attain. In these operations, other government agencies may often have the lead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined and many times will not involve command authority as understood within the military. This arrangement may cause commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. Because operations other than war will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counter-productive friction.

c. **Security:** Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to our interests. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the operation, and even looters after a natural disaster. JFCs also should be ready constantly to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to be capable of rapid transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

d. **Restraint:** Apply appropriate military capability prudently. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons restraint often needs to be understood by the individual service member because a single act could cause critical political consequences.

e. **Perseverance:** Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some operations other than war may be short, others protracted. Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to assess crisis response options against their contribution to long-term strategic objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action but does require careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such action. Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on operations. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of the national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is often the requirement for success.

f. **Legitimacy:** Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. This principle focuses on internationally sanctioned standards, as well as the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Joint force operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing team. PYSOOP can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operations.

APPENDIX 2: PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS AND IMPERATIVES OF ARMY OPERATIONS

Below is the principles of operations and the four sets of imperatives for army operations extracted from FM 100-5 (Draft).⁸²

1. The 11 principles of operations are the foundation of Army doctrine. They instruct and inform our conduct of operations at all levels. There is no priority among the principles. Indeed, they should not be viewed independently of one another, but as a collective whole.

a. **Objective:** Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal. The principle of objective drives all military activity. When undertaking any mission, commanders should [have] a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. At the strategic level this means having a clear vision of what the world should look like following an operation. This is normally a desired political end state. Strategic commanders must fully appreciate the nature of this end state and how the military conditions they achieve contribute to it. At the operational and tactical levels objectives compel commanders to insure their actions contribute to their higher headquarters' goals. Intermediate objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the desired end state. Those that do not must be avoided.

b. **Offensive:** Seize, train, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results. It is the essence of successful operations. Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. They force the enemy to react rather than act. Offensive operations are the means by which we impose our will. Offensive operations are essential to maintaining the freedom of action necessary for success. They are required to exploit vulnerabilities and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. An offensive spirit must be inherent in all actions. Even the defense must be an active, not a passive one.

c. **Maneuver:** Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is shifting combat power—forces and effects—to gain advantage. It is the dynamic element of warfare that concentrates and disperses combat power in a manner that places and keeps the enemy at a disadvantage, thus achieving results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance by making him confront new problems and new dangers faster than he can deal with them. It is the principal means by which we gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success. Maneuver is more than just fire and movement. It is the dynamic, flexible application of all elements of combat power. It requires flexible thought, plans, and operations, and the considered application of the principles of massed effects, surprise, and economy of force.

d. **Massed Effects:** Mass the effect of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space. Forces at all levels mass the effects of combat power to overwhelm opponents and gain control of the situation. We mass military power to achieve both

destructive and constructive effects. We mass in time by applying the effects of combat power simultaneously. This achieves an overwhelming moral and systems effect—overload. We mass in space by concentrating combat power effects against a select combination of physical points. Massing does not mandate concentration against one or two points. Commanders mass against the right combination of points. The aim is to strike a combination of critical elements whose loss shatters the coherence of enemy operations. These elements may be deployed in a small area and vulnerable to concentrated attacks which mass in time and space. Others may be spread throughout the battle space and vulnerable only to simultaneous, distributed operations which mass in time.

e. **Economy of Force:** Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force ensure no effort is wasted... Economy of force is a reciprocal of the principle of massed effects. It requires that minimum resources be employed in areas away from the main effort, whether that effort is directed against a single point or a combination of distributed points. Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority—overwhelming effects—where decision is sought. Economy of force missions often require the forces employed to conduct operations with the bare minimum of essential resources.

f. **Simplicity:** Prepare uncomplicated concepts and plans and direct, concise order to ensure thorough understanding. At all levels, concepts, plans, and orders should be as simple and direct as possible. Other factors being equal, the simplest concepts and plans are normally the best. Clear, concise orders minimize confusion and misunderstanding.

g. **Surprise:** Achieve effects disproportionate to the effort by taking unexpected action. Surprise results from taking action for which an opponent is unprepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken completely unaware, only that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, employment of unexpected systems, deception operations, variation of tactics and methods of operation, and operation security. Information dominance is key to surprise. Surprise applies to the full range of operations. For example, in operations against a hostile force, surprise can greatly magnify the effect of combat actions and systems. In other situations, forces may preempt violence by demonstrating an unexpected capacity for combined arms combat. They may thwart attempt at terrorism and thievery by unexpectedly changing routine when delivering supplies and services.

h. **Unity of Effort:** Achieve common purpose and direction through unit of command, coordination, and cooperation. Employing military force in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of effort. Unity of effort directs and coordinates the action of all forces—military and civilian—toward a common goal or objective. Whenever possible, unity of effort should be achieved through unit of command—vesting a single commander with the requisite authorities to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal. When this is not practical, forces achieve unity of effort through coordination and cooperation.

i. **Exploitation:** Take advantage of and make lasting temporary effects of battlefield success. At every level, commanders must plan to secure the results of successful operations. Indeed, no operation is successful until and unless it has been properly exploited. Leaders must develop plans and allocate sufficient resources to ensure that opportunities created by initial gains are rapidly and decisively exploited.

j. **Security:** Never permit an enemy to acquire the unexpected advantage. Security is essential to protection and preserving combat power. Security results from the measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, observations, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, or annoyance. Security may also be obtained by deception operations designed to confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the force and the operation. The principle of security does not suggest over-cautiousness or avoiding calculated risks which is an inherent part of conflict.

k. **Morale:** Build, maintain, and restore fighting spirit. Warfare is ultimately a human endeavor that relies primarily on the fighting spirit—morale—of the soldiers and units engaged. Leaders at every level must understand that a force's fighting spirit requires constant attention. It must be deliberately built, actively maintained, and constantly restored. Soldiers and units do not have an inexhaustible supply of morale. It is continually sapped by the dangers and hardships of campaigning. Fighting spirit is maintained by providing competent, confident, disciplined leadership; proper tools to accomplish assigned missions; and adequate food and rest. It is restored by opportunities to recover from perilous, demanding missions. Leaders must take all necessary steps to appraise the fighting spirit of their units and take necessary steps to keep it at the highest possible level.

2. The imperatives of Army operations. To accomplish assigned missions, Army forces conduct four basic categories of operations: Offense, Defense, Stability, and Support. They conduct these operations to compel, deter, reassure, and support. Below is the imperatives for the four basic categories of Army operations.

a. **Offensive operations** are governed by six general imperatives. Apply these imperatives in combining core functions, operating systems, and offensive forms to plan and execute attacks.

1. Place the defender in a weak condition and position.
2. Attack weakness, avoid strength.
3. Strike with extraordinary violence.
4. Press the fight—never let the enemy recover from the initial blow.
5. Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
6. Plan for and resource the exploitation's.

- b. While each **defensive operation** is unique, six imperatives guide commanders in conducting the defense.
 - 1. Maximize advantage through preparation.
 - 2. Conceal and protect weakness.
 - 3. Disrupt attack preparations.
 - 4. Disrupt momentum of the attack.
 - 5. Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
 - 6. Complement and follow the defense with offensive actions.
- c. While each operation is unique, seven broad imperatives help forces develop concepts and schemes for executing **stability operations**.
 - 1. Stress force protection.
 - 2. Emphasize information operations.
 - 3. Maximize interagency, joint, and multinational operations.
 - 4. Display capability to apply force without threatening.
 - 5. Understand potential for disproportionate consequences of individual and small unit actions.
 - 6. Apply force selectively.
 - 7. Act decisively to prevent escalation.
- d. Although each **support operation** is unique, they are generally guided by six broad imperatives.
 - 1. Always stress force protection.
 - 2. Provide essential support to the largest number of people.
 - 3. Coordinate actions with other agencies.
 - 4. Hand off to civilian agencies as soon as feasible.
 - 5. Establish measures of success.
 - 6. Conduct robust civil affairs and information operations.

ENDNOTES

¹ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Combined Arms Center (CAC), FM 100-5, *Operations* (Coordinating Draft), (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CAC, 14 January 1997), i. Headquarters, CAC, FM 100-5 Writing Team, "Information Briefing To General Hartzog: Coordination Campaign," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 December, 1997. For consistency, this monograph refers to the coordinating draft of the 1998 version of FM 100-5 as FM 100-5 (Draft); the current manual as FM 100-5; and earlier versions of the manual as FM 100-5 with the date of publication.

² Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), I-1 to I-4.

³ Headquarters, CAC, FM 100-5 Writing Team, "Decision Brief to CG TRADOC," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 December 1996.

⁴ FM 100-5 (Draft), I-2-1.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Joint Warfare Of The Armed Forces Of The United States*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), i-vi; I-3 to I-4.

⁷ Richard M. Swain, "Filling The Void: The Operational Art And The U.S. Army," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, n.d.). 3-4.

⁸ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Capstone And Keystone Primer*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 2, 83.

⁹ *Title 10, Armed Forces, U.S. Code*, sec. 3062 (1956).

¹⁰ Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* 119 (March 1974): 7.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² James J. Schneider, Course Syllabus, AMSP Course 1, "Foundations of Military Theory," AY 86-87. (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1996), A-2-2.

¹³ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 9. Senge combines complexity theory and systems thinking to address organizational learning and growth, stressing the importance of organizations to develop a shared vision

from common mental models. Senge describes systems thinking as knowing about the forces and interrelationships that shape the behavior of systems that help people determine how to change systems more effectively.

¹⁴ Teddy C. Cranford, "Mental Models And Operations Other Than War," (MMAS, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 8-9.

¹⁵ Dr. James J. Synder offered a similar model to explain the relationship of theory to doctrine during a discussion at the School of Advanced Military Studies (AY 96-97). Author's notes.

¹⁶ The current FM 100-5 for example, reflects the theories of war expressed by Clausewitz, Jomini and Fuller. Additionally, the manual incorporates the American way of war based on our experiences in conflict.

¹⁷ Major Paul H. Herbert in "Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," (37-44, 68-71) depicts how these internal influences affected the 1976 version of FM 100-5. General DePuy saw doctrine as a way of changing the Army's mindset from Vietnam to NATO Europe and the renewed threat of the Warsaw Pact. According to Herbert, "...the manual was the personal project of General Depuy and his subordinate generals." DePuy's vision of changing the Army's focus from dismounted infantry to a heavy force formed around the tank led to internal friction between the Infantry and Armor Schools. Each branch attempted to influence the 1976 capstone doctrine with an understanding that the new doctrine would impact their future role within the Army.

¹⁸ The White House, *A National Strategy Of Engagement And Enlargement*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1996), iii.

¹⁹ Michael Rampy, "The Keystone Doctrine: FM 100-5, *Operations*," *Military Review*, 6 (June 1994): 17.

²⁰ Rampy, 18.

²¹ FM 100-5 (Draft), I-1-1.

²² John L. Romjue, "American Army Doctrine For The Post-Cold War," (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996). 11. The more popular books read by Civil War officers included *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre* by Antoine Jomini, and the *Elements of Military Art and Science*, published in 1846 by Henry W. Halleck. These works along with Dennis H. Mahan's *An Elementary Treatise ect.*, laid the foundation for American professional

literature during the Civil War. The writing of Jomini had great influence on both Halleck (later to become the general in chief of the Union Army) and Mahan.

²³ Ibid., 13. Additionally in 1921, J.F.C. Fuller's principles of war appeared in the War Department's Training Regulations No. 10.

²⁴ Rampy, 20.

²⁵ Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 196-76," *Leavenworth Papers* No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 1.

²⁶ Ibid., 24-29. The Army's doctrine during this period called for self contained independent "battle groups" positioned throughout the width and depth of the battlefield to counter the effects of atomic weapons.

²⁷ Swain, 6.

²⁸ Ibid., 2, 44.

²⁹ Romjue, 16-20.

³⁰ Ibid., 35-36.

³¹ Eliot A. Cohen and Jon Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* (New York, The Free Press, 1990), 26. The authors use five case studies of military failures from American antisubmarine warfare in 1942, to the defeat of the American Eighth Army in Korea to illustrate a direct relationship between organizational learning and military failure.

³² Government Accounting Office (GAO), National Security and International Affairs Division, *Peace Operations - Effect Of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors On Unit Capability*, by Richard Davis, Report to Congressional Registers GAO/NSIAD 96-14, 2.

³³ Mitchell M. Waldrop, *Complexity*, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992), 11-12. Complexity theory suggests that we free our thinking from the day to day compartmentalized thought and see systems as a whole to help predict trends and forecast requirements.

³⁴ Ibid., 12. During a discussion of complexity theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies (AY 96-97), Dr. James J. Synder offered a similar model to explain complexity theory. Author's notes.

³⁵ The Napoleonic campaign of 1805 in which the French decidedly defeated the coalition armies of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, is useful in showing the utility of complexity theory for militaries managing change. The Prussian Army under Frederick the Great in the mid 1700's adopted a system of tactical mobility based on drill and discipline that was unmatched on the European battlefield. By the turn of the century, however, this tactical system embraced by the other continental armies was antiquated in comparison to the system of war the French began in the late 1770's.

French philosophes Pierre Bourcet and Comte de Guibert envisioned in the 1770's and 80's, a new organizational structure for the French Army and a concept of campaign that would fundamentally change the conduct of war. Both Bourcet and Guibert saw semi-independent operational units formed from the newly created division, moving on separate axis against the enemy but remained in mutual supporting difference from each other. (Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory: 1809 And The Emergence Of Modern War*, 7.) The French Revolution provided the social and political change in the environment for the fruition of these "operational concepts" developed by Bourcet and Guibert. Often beyond the edge of chaos and in turbulence during the Reign of Terror, the French Army by 1805 was able to establish a balance point in chaos and produced a national army organized in combined arms corps that significantly changed the conduct of war. The organizational, command and control, and logistical changes in the French Army are examples of a complex system learning, growing, and adapting to the changing environment at the edge of chaos. The armies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, remaining stable in their organization and tactics were overcome by change and soundly defeated by Napoleon at Ulm and Austerlitz between October and November of 1805. (David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, 381-439.; R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War," 91-112).

³⁶ If the Army chose to implement the concepts of Force XXI before the Army was ready monetarily, intellectually, and or technologically, the Army would move beyond the edge of chaos and into turbulence.

³⁷ Thomas R. Goedkoop, "Supporting The CINCs: The Role Of The Goldwater-Nichols Department Of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," MMAS, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.

³⁸ Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 3. The intent of the legislation was:

1. to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the department;
2. to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
3. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

4. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
5. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
6. to improve joint officer management policies; and
otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

³⁹ *Joint Doctrine Capstone And Keystone Primer*, 2, 83.

⁴⁰ Goedkoop, 31. Though other publications were available to the field in "test form," the 1991 version of JP 1 was the first fully approved manual that dealt with joint warfare from an authoritative position. This manual served as the basis in which a series of joint publications would evolve.

⁴¹ Morris J. Boyd, "Doctrine and Force XXI: Leading the Army into the 21st Century," [TRADOC home page] available at <http://204.7.227.753:443/force21/sv/sv-essay/&doc/fxxihtml>, Internet. accessed 1 March 1997.

⁴² JP 3-0, GL-15. Capstone doctrine includes JP 1, JP 0-2, and JP 3-0. The publications below the capstone doctrine are considered keystone publications. Additional specific doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures derive from the joint keystone. Joint Publication 3-0 is both a capstone and keystone manual. It serves as the keystone manual for joint operations in which other subordinate manuals such as JP 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War* derive. In addition, JP 3-0 serves as a capstone manual for joint operations providing the common thread for the other joint keystone manuals.

⁴³ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, "Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine And Antipodean Insights," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 3, 12.

⁴⁴ JP 3-0, i.

⁴⁵ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Joint Warfare Of The Armed Forces*, (Washington, D.C.: 1995), I-4.

⁴⁶ JP 1, iv. In the inside cover of JP 3-0, General Shalikashvili writes that JP 3-0 forms the very core of joint warfighting and establishes the framework for our forces' ability to fight. "The fundamental concepts and principle contained in JP 3-0 provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint and multinational operations."

⁴⁷ JP 3-0, Chart located on page I-2.

⁴⁸ Department of Defense, JP 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), Inside front cover.

⁴⁹ JP 3-0, I-1 to I-2.

⁵⁰ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, NAVMC 2890: *Small Wars Manual*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940). [reprint by Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987]. This doctrine, considered one of the best pre-World War II manuals on peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, recognized the uniqueness of “small wars” calling for a shift from the traditional military thought process.

⁵¹ Jennifer M. Taw and Robert C. Leicht, “The New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?”, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), viii.

⁵² Ibid. Two of the more notable manuals produced by the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict in the late 1980s included JSC 3-07, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* and FM 100-20/AFP (Air Force Publication) 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*.

⁵³ JP 3-07, vii.

⁵⁴ JP 3-07, II-2 to II-5. Field Manual 100-5 and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* also list the principles of OOTW. Field Manual 100-5 (13-3) states, “Army warfighting doctrine has long been based on well-established principles of war that have withstood the test of time and experience and remain embedded in our doctrine. Operations other than war also have principles that guide our actions. For those operations other than war that involve our forces in direct combat, the principles of war apply.”

⁵⁵ International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), 260. In Chapter IX, “Preparation and Preparedness,” the International Peace Academy states, “Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach by the soldier to a different set of circumstances from those he would normally find on the field of battle; an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action.”

⁵⁶ FM 100-5 Writing Team, “Information Briefing to General Hartzog: Coordination Campaign.”

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ FM 100-5 (Draft), I-2-1.

⁵⁹ Ibid., IV-overview-1.

⁶⁰ Chart from FM 100-5 Writing Team, “Decision Brief to CG TRADOC”.

⁶¹ Field Manual 100-5 (Draft) states that the Army's *operational concept* is the core of its doctrine. "It guides our conduct of [in?] campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements....Serving as a primary land element of a joint and multinational force, Army forces apply military power in a manner designed to gain and exploit freedom of action. Whether fighting a large mechanized enemy, an elusive insurgency, or the effects of a natural disaster, our constant aim is to seize the initiative, maintain momentum, and exploit success in order to control the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation (II-1-1).

⁶² FM 100-5 (Draft), II-2-1.

⁶³ FM 100-5 Writing Team, "Decision Brief to CG TRADOC."

⁶⁴ FM 100-5 (Draft) introduces the core functions in Part Two, Chapter 4 of the manual. "In conducting operations, Army forces perform five core functions: See, Shape, Shield, Strike, Move. Core functions are the fundamental actions forces take to apply military power". (II-4-1) According to the draft, the five core functions should not be viewed independently because they have no utility except in relationship to one another and the objective being sought. The core function apply to all operating systems, categories of operations, and levels of command.

1. **See:** Gain and maintain knowledge of elements of METT-TC [mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time, and *civilians*] at all appropriate echelons. See the enemy, friendly force, neutrals, and the environment.
2. **Shape:** Establish the optimum environment for conducting operations. Shape enemy, friendly, and neutral elements.
3. **Shape:** Establish the optimum environment for conducting operations. Shape enemy, friendly, and neutral elements.
4. **Shield:** Deny opponents the ability to threaten the force or interfere with operations, and preserve strength through preventive action.
5. **Strike:** Apply lethal and nonlethal capabilities to achieve objectives.

⁶⁵ FM 100-5 (Draft), II-5-1. The draft states that "[o]perating systems are the means by which forces execute the core functions see, shape, shield, strike, and move. The operating systems fall into two basic categories: *engagement systems* and *integrating systems*. Engagement systems (information dominance; maneuver; air defense; recon, surveillance, and intelligence; mobility and survive; and fire support) apply effects directly to achieve objectives. Integrating systems (command and control and combat service support) enable the application and orchestration of the engagement systems.

⁶⁶ Ibid., II-overview-1. Chart from FM 100-5 Writing Team, "Decision Brief to CG TRADOC".

⁶⁷ Senge, 3.

⁶⁸ FM 100-5 Writing Team, "Decision Brief to CG TRADOC."; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.

⁶⁹ Ludwig von Bertalanffy in *General Systems Theory*, introduced systems thinking to the scientific community in the 1950's. Concerned with the growing compartmentalization of science, Bertalanffy argues that certain general ideas could have relevance across a broad spectrum of discipline. Systems thinking is a common theme in both M. Mitchell Waldrop's book *Complexity* and Peter Senge's *The Fifth Discipline*.

⁷⁰ Clausewitz, 78.

⁷¹ JP 3-0, I-2 to I-4. The graphical depiction of the model of conflict in JP 3-0 does not include the states of environment (war, conflict, and peacetime). The narrative, however, states that military operations range from operations in war, hostile situations (conflict), and peace..

⁷² Cranford, 6. Major Cranford uses a similar model to depict the model of conflict in the 1993 FM 100-5.

⁷³ FM 100-5 (Draft) I-2-1 and I-2-2.

⁷⁴ Ibid., I-2-4. Interestingly, while the authors go through great pains not to categorize conflict by types (such as editing quotes of Clausewitz and J.F.C. Fuller replacing the word *war* with *operations*), this statement indicates there is more than one form of conflict. A natural question is: If war is the most violent form of conflict, what are the other forms? OOTW?

⁷⁵ John P. White, "Defense Organization Today," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 1996): 20.

⁷⁶ JP 3-0, i.

⁷⁷ FM 100-5 (Draft) Writing Team, "Information Brief to CG TRADOC."

⁷⁸ FM 100-5, 1-1.

⁷⁹ JP 1, vi.

⁸⁰ Rampy, 21.

⁸¹ The principle of war in JP 3-0 are listed in appendix A pages A-1 to A-3. JP 3-0 list the principles of OOTW on pages V-2 to V-4.

⁸² The principles of army operations are found in Part Two of Chapter 2, FM 100-5 (Draft), II-2-1 to II-2-8. The imperative for offense, defense, stability, and support operations repetitively, are found on pages IV-1-2, IV-2-2, IV-3-2, and IV-4-2.

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